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JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS RELATING
TO NORTH PACJFIC FISHERIES
SHIGERU ODA*
INTRODUCTION

Japan has a vital interest in high seas fishing which provides her
with a major source of food for her inhabitants1 and a useful commodity for export.' At the present time, this island nation is among
the world's leading producers of fishery products.' The number of
Japanese engaged in the fishing industry in Japan is considerable.'
The high seas fishing efforts of Japan, however, have at times conflicted
with the interests of other nations. Indeed, on occasion this writer has
emphasized that we face a very difficult question regarding allocation
of high seas fish resources among the nations.5 Japan was confronted
with this question, and the international fisheries agreements involving
the North Pacific, of which Japan is a party, show different ways of
allocating fish resources resulting from the negotiation process.
This paper will begin with a treatment of the North Pacific Fisheries
Convention of 1952. After exploring this treaty and the abstention
formula embodied in it, a study of the Northwest Pacific Fisheries
Convention of 1956 and the formula incorporated therein will be
undertaken. After studying the 1952 and 1956 Conventions, the paper
will proceed to examine the recent fisheries agreement of 1965 between
* Law degree, 1947 Tokyo; LL.M., 1952, J.S.D., 1953, Yale; Doctor of Law, 1962,
Tohoku. Professor of International Law, Tohoku University, Japan.
'The following table indicates the per capita quantities of food, protein and calories taken daily in Japan in 1964, and the portion thereof composed of fish resources:
Food
Protein
Calories
Total:
1239.1 grams
74.4 grams
222.6 grams
Fish-shellfish:

86.3

"

17.5

"

116.4

"

Of protein taken, 28.7 grams were taken from animal protein. See OFFICE OF THE
PRIME MINISTER, JAPAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 602 (1966). [hereinafter cited as
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK].

In 1964, total Japanese exports amounted to $6,673.73 million, of which fish and
oils of fish and marine mammals contributed $246.84 million. See 1964 U.N. YEARBOOK
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS at 408.
'In 1964, Japan produced 6,334,700 metric tons of fish products out of total world
production of 51,600,000 metric tons. Japan was second, next to Peru which produced
9,130,700 metric tons. The United States produced 2,638,000 metric tons. In the year
1963-1964, Japan caught 24,080 units of whale of the 63,001 world total. The United
States caught only 273 units. See 1965 U.N. STATISTICAL YEARBOOK at 155, 157.
'Those who were engaged in fisheries and aquiculture in 1966 amounted to 590,000
of the 48,470,000 employed persons. See STATISTICAL YEARBOOK at 54.
aSee, e.g., Oda, Recent Problems of International High Sea Fisheries: Allocation
of Fishery Resources, 1 PanpiNE INTL L.J. 510 (1962).
[ 63]
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Japan and the Republic of Korea. This last agreement contains an
idea of equal sharing of high seas fish resources among the nations
concerned.
I. THE NORTH PACIFIC FISHERIES CONVENTION OF 19526

The negotiations which produced the 1952 Convention between Canada, Japan and the United States, took place prior to the signing of
the peace treaty in an atmosphere of anxiety. The American fishing
industry was apprehensive over the possible return of the Japanese as
competitors in Alaskan waters where certain stocks had already been
fully utilized by the Americans and Canadians. One of the most important problems considered at the conference was whether any of the
participating states had acquired any right or privilege regarding fishing on the high seas.
The United States delegate proposed that exercise of the right under
international law to exploit high seas fisheries should be waived with
respect to those resources which had been so fully utilized in the past
that future intensive fishing would be unwise. According to the United
States view, however, waiver of the right to fish particular fishery
resources should be lifted in the case of any state which had recently
begun or was currently employed in developing or maintaining, on a
substantial scale, the exploitation of fish resources; or if such fish
resources were located in areas of the high seas contiguous to that
state's territorial sea; or if fishing in the area was being done chiefly
by a country or countries not party to this convention. Thus, the
waiver requirement for purposes of conservation did not apply to all
countries; rather, it was recommended that, in certain circumstances,
some states should be exempt from the application of waiver of the
right to fish.
Japan, on the other hand, argued for a principle of free access and
free competition on the high seas, although she did not oppose the
implementation of certain conservation efforts. The exemption principle proposed by the United States delegate was dropped from the
final text of the convention, after it had met with strenuous objection
from the Japanese delegate. However, without referring to the general
principle, the United States and Canada succeeded in keeping Japan
from fishing in certain specified fisheries.
The main idea embodied in the 1952 Convention is the abstention
6 The historical background and a legal analysis of this convention can be found in
S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 65-71 (1963).

1967 1

FISHERIES CONVENTION

formula. That formula requires that one state, Japan, abstain from
fishing pursuant to the agreement. This state receives nothing in return,
while others, exempt from the obligation of abstention-for whatever
reasons considered justifiable-are entitled to maximum utilization of
the resources in the convention area. In effect, the abstention formula
ensures a maximum share to one party, while giving nothing in return
to others. The writer does not hesitate to count the 1952 Convention as
one of the most epoch-making treaties in the history of international
law, in that it broke with previous conceptions of the exploitation of
marine resources, namely, that all nations concerned should compete
with each other on an equal basis to acquire as many resources as
possible within limitations (applying equally to all) aimed at conserving those resources.
According to the annex to the treaty, which forms an integral part of
the agreement, Japan agrees to abstain from fishing certain stocks of
fish, while Canada and the United States agree to continue to carry out
necessary conservation measures for those stocks. The 5-year period,
in which no determination or recommendation should be made as to
whether the stocks would continue to qualify for abstention, expired on
June 12, 1958. Certain stocks of herring and halibut have been removed from the original annex, in accordance with recommendations of
the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission established pursuant to the convention. 7 The contracting parties agreed in the protocol
to the convention that longitude 175°W. and the line following the
7
The following stocks have been removed from the annex as stocks with regard to
'which Japan agreed to abstain from fishing:
herring: the herring stocks off the coast of Alaska south of the Alaskan Peninsula and east of the meridian passing through the extremity of the Alaskan
Peninsula-1959 Session;
the herring stocks off the coast of the United States, south of the entrance to the
Strait of Juan de Fuca-1961 Session;
the herring stocks off the west coast of the Queen Charlotte Islands-1962
Session.
halibut: the halibut stock of the eastern Bering Sea-1962 Session.
Thus, paragraph 1 of the annex concerning stocks with regard to which Japan agrees
to abstain from fishing, now reads:
(a) Halibut-The Convention area off the coast of Canada and the United States
of America, exclusive of the Bering Sea, in which commercial fishing for
halibut is being or can be prosecuted. Halibut referred to herein shall be
those originating along the coast of North America.
(b) Herring-The Convention area off the coast of Canada in which commercial
fishing for herring of Canadian origin is being or can be prosecuted, exclusive
of the waters of the high seas north of latitude 51°56'N. and west of the
Queen Charlotte Islands and west of a line drawn between Langara Point on
Langara Island, Queen Charlotte Islands, and Cape Muzon on Dall Island in
Southeast Alaska.
(c) Salmon-(as it stands in the original Annex)
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meridian passing through the western extremity of Atka Island would
determine the area in which, in accordance with the provisions of the
annex, Japan would abstain from the exploitation of salmon and in
which conservation measures for salmon would be enforced by Canada
and the United States. The 1750 line was considered provisional and
subject to confirmation and readjustment. The Commission was expected to conduct suitable studies to determine a line or lines which
best divided the salmon of Asiatic origin from the salmon of Canadian
and United States origin. No commission study has shown beyond a
reasonable doubt that any other line would more equitably divide Asian
and North American salmon; the "provisional" line adopted in the
1952 Protocol still demarcates the abstention areas.
There is mutual discontent with the 1952 convention. The United
States and Canada are not satisfied because they feel that Japanese
fishermen are able to fish for North American salmon on the high seas.
Japan wishes to eliminate the abstention formula; but she has taken no
formal action to reject that formula by terminating the 1952 convention. Japan has voiced disapproval of the abstention formula in recent
negotiations. In November, 1962, the government of Japan informed
Canada and the United States of its desire to hold negotiations on
revision of the convention. These negotiations were to take place in
anticipation of the possibility that Japan or the other parties would
terminate the convention. Termination was possible because the convention provided that the agreement was to be mutually binding only
for a period of 10 years, that is, until June 12, 1963; thereafter any
party on one-year notice could terminate the convention. The first
meeting of the three countries was held in June of 1963.8 In the course
of this conference, the Japanese delegate argued that the abstention
formula was intrinsically unfair since it was actually designed for the
protection of fishing industries in certain countries rather than for conservation of the fishery resources. After voicing his objections to the
abstention formula, the Japanese delegate proposed a new convention
which would replace the abstention formula with a provision stating
that joint conservation measures should be established on a scientific
and nondiscriminatory basis, and that fishery management conducted
by Canada and the United States should be given due consideration in
determining joint conservation measures. The United States and Canada rejected this proposal. The Canadian delegate regarded the ab' See Oda & Owada, Annual Review of Japanese Practice in International Law-Il
(1963), 9 JAP. ANN. INT'L L. 101, 122-25 (1965).

19671

FISHERIES CONVENTION

stention formula as sound, saying it was designed to provide for
rational utilization of specific fisheries which could no longer survive
without it. The United States also thought that the abstention formula
provided a clearly defined procedure for dealing with special situations
where certain stocks of fish had been made more productive by extraordinary efforts of a particular nation. The United States delegate
concluded that the present convention provided the basis for resolving
current North Pacific fishery problems and would provide sound and
progressive precedents for the development of international practice in
this field.
Needless to say, the June 1963 negotiations were not successful.
Japan opposed the abstention formula; the United States and Canada
supported it. Two subsequent meetings between Canada, Japan and
the United States in September-October, 1963, and in SeptemberOctober, 1964 failed to produce any definitive results.9 The 1952
North Pacific Fisheries Convention remains in force, but its future is
uncertain.
II. NORTHWEST PACIFIC FISEIEs CONVENTION OF 195610
In 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union entered into negotiations to
provide for the regulation of high seas fishing efforts in the Northwest
Pacific Ocean. These negotiations took place prior to the consummation of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan, and immediately after the Soviet Union had issued a decree purporting to regulate salmon fishing in the high seas areas of the Okhotsk Sea. The
issues of how the convention came into being, however, are beyond the
scope of this paper.
The main features in the Northwest Pacific Fisheries Convention of
1956 are the total prohibition of salmon fishing in certain specified
areas of the high seas and the limitation of annual salmon catch in
other areas. The extent of the prohibited areas for salmon fishing is
described in detail in the annex attached to and forming an integral
part of the convention. The annex, and hence the extent of the prohibited area, is to be revised, if necessary, by the Japan-Soviet Northwest
Pacific Fisheries Commission established pursuant to the convention.
Revisions must be based on scientific data. The prohibited areas for
'See id. at 125-26; see also Oda & Owada, Annual Review of Japanese Practice in
InternationalLaw--Ill (1964), 10 JAP. ANN. INTL L. 56, 72-73 (1966).
"The historical background and a legal analysis of this convention can be found
in S. ODA, supra note 6, at 28-31, 72-76.
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salmon fishing were gradually expanded up to 1962, so as to cover the
Sea of Japan north of latitude 45°N. and the Okhotsk Sea and the
western part of the Bering Sea (see map 1, appendix). So also, the
total annual salmon catch in certain areas is to be determined by the
Commission. In 1962, the parts of the convention areas which had not
theretofore been specified as regulation areas were designated as Regulation Area B while the former regulation areas became Regulation
Area A (see map 1, appendix). The following table indicates the
allowable amount of salmon catch per year:
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961

1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

Regulation Area

Other Convention Areas

120,000 tons
110,000
85,000
67,500
65,000

free
free
free
free
free

Regulation Area A

Regulation Area B

55,000
57,000
55,000
56,000
48,000
52,500

60,000
63,000
55,000
59,000
48,000
55,500

At the time the convention was adopted, the Soviet Union had not
engaged in salmon fishing on the high seas on a large scale, and she did
not contemplate doing so in the future. Most Russian salmon fishing
takes place in the rivers of the Soviet Union. Consequently, the provisions of the convention do not significantly affect Russian salmon fishing, while Japanese salmon fishing within the convention area is subject to control by the Commission. While the domestic policies of the
Soviet Union on conservation within her territorial rivers should be of
vital importance to the Commission in setting forth conservation measures applicable to Japanese fishing vessels on the high seas, in fact, this
convention has subordinated an overall policy of high seas fishing for
migratory salmon to conservation policies unilaterally pursued by the
Soviet Union within her own territory. Thus, the stocks of salmon in
the Northwest Pacific are distributed in such a way as to be advantageous to the Soviet Union, which has a free hand in adopting fishing
policies within her territorial limits.
The quota system incorporated into the 1956 Convention tends to
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favor the coastal state over the state engaged in high sea fishing operations. Even though negotiations are held each year to determine the
quotas of the regulation areas, these negotiations have failed to protect
the Japanese high sea fisheries. In fact, the determination of the total
annual catch of salmon has been the most difficult task facing the Commission at its annual sessions, especially in its early period. Since 1957,
the Commission has spent as much as 52, 100, 122, 107, and 105 days,
discussing this matter at its annual sessions. Theoretically, the reduction in quotas affects both nations, but in fact only Japan is regulated
because the convention extends to international waters only. Because
salmon are an anadromous fish, the Soviet Union is able to take significant quantities of salmon by operating within territorial waters. The
Soviet Union is theoretically free to take as many salmon as it wishes
inside its own territorial waters.
The quota system, like the abstention formula, is ostensibly designed
to conserve particular stocks of fish. In fact, these principles seem to
provide a scheme whereby the coastal state is able to regulate the high
seas fishing activities of Japan, thereby reducing the Japanese take,
while maximizing its own fishery production. 1
Another formula for artificial sharing is found in the 1956 Convention, with respect to king crab off the western coast of Kamchatka
Peninsula. Although the convention itself does not provide for any
fixed catch of king crab by the two parties, the Commission, at its
session in 1959, divided between the Japanese and the Russians the
fishing areas for king crab in the areas as mentioned above. Since
1958, the amount of the catch of king crab for the Soviet Union and
Japan has been determined by the Commission in the ratio of 3:2. This
ratio was amended by the Commission in 1965 to be 7:4. Another
amendment was undertaken by the Commission in 1967 for the year
1969 and thereafter; the ratio will be 2:1.
West Kamachatka King Crab Quotas
Soviet Union

Japan

1958

480,000 boxes

320,000 boxes

3:2

1959

420,000

280,000

3:2

1960
1961

390,000
390,000

260,000
260,000

3:2
3:2

Ratio

'It would be unfair not to mention that the Soviet Union caught 56,223 tons of
salmon in 1966, while Japan caught 111,760 tons (Area A: 47,782 tons; Area E:
53,395 tons; coastal waters not covered by the convention: 10,583 tons).
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1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
III.

Soziet Union

Japan

378,000
378,000
378,000
420,000
420,000
406,000
432,000
432,000

252,000
252,000
252,000
240,000
240,000
232,000
224,000
216,000
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Ratio

3:2
3:2
3:2
7:4
7:4
7:4
2:1

BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE

REPUBLIC OF KOREA' 2
After many disagreements over conflicting fishery policies,'1 3 Japan
and the Republic of Korea entered into the Agreement on Fisheries,
with the conclusion of the Normalization Treaty and related documents
on June 22, 1965.
Both countries mutually recognized that each party has the right to
establish a fishery zone of 12 miles within which it will have exclusive
fishery jurisdiction.' 4 Both parties agreed not to raise any objections
to the exclusion of the fishing vessels of the other from fishing operations in their respective fishery zones (article 1). This convention is
the first and only international agreement under which Japan has consensually recognized the establishment of a 12-mile fishery zone.
The convention also provides for a joint regulation zone to be established off the Korean coast outside the 12-mile zone (article 2) and for
a joint resources survey zone outside of the joint regulation zone
(article 5) (see map 2, appendix). The extent of the joint resources
survey zone and the nature of the survey to be conducted within it are
to be determined after consultation between both countries on the
basis of recommendations made by the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint
Fisheries Commission established pursuant to the convention (article
"The English translation of this agreement and other related documents prepared
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan are printed in 10 JAP. ANN. INT'L L.
264-83 (1966). The author's brief comments on this agreement are found in Oda, The
Normalization of Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, 61 Am. J.
INT'L L. 35, 52-53 (1967).
"The fisheries disputes between Japan and the Republic of Korea in the post-war
period are explained in S. ODA, supra note 6, at 26-28.
"The straight baseline was used by Korea at four points on the Korean Peninsula
after consultation with the Japanese Government (Exchange of Notes concerning the
Straight Baselines for the Fishery Zone of the Republic of Korea). In addition, the
Korean fishery zone was extended, as a provisional measure, beyond the originally
agreed upon 12-mile limit in the area around Cheju Island (Exchange of Notes concerning the Fishery Zone of the Republic of Korea).
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5). In fact, the zone for the first joint resources survey was recommended by the Commission at its first session in 1966.
Within the joint regulation zone, which is demarcated by the lines as
indicated in the attached map (see map 2, appendix), the provisional
regulation measures described in the annex are to be implemented with
respect to dragnet, seine, and mackerel-angling fishing by vessels of
over 60 tons, until such time as conservation measures necessary to
maintain maximum sustained productivity of fishery resources are implemented on the basis of sufficient surveys (article 3). Enforcement
and jurisdiction in this joint regulation zone, including the halting and
boarding of vessels, are exercised only by the party whose flag the vessel
flies. Each party is obliged to give the exercise pertinent guidance and
supervision of its own nationals and vessels in order to ensure that they
faithfully observe the provisional regulation measures, and to carry out
domestic measures, including appropriate penalties against violation
thereof (article 4). It is noted with interest that both parties, in the
agreed minutes between the two countries, agree to respect the other's
domestic fishing ban areas, i.e., that either government will take necessary measures to prevent fishing vessels of its country from engaging
in fishing operations in the fishing ban areas of the other.
Conservation measures in the joint regulation zone as prescribed in
the annex are based principally on orthodox conservation measures
applicable to both parties, such as size of fishing vessels, mesh size,
and power of fish-luring lights. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
consider the appropriateness of these measures in light of fishery science. It should be noted with interest that, in addition to these
measures, conservation measures designed to enable Japan and the
Republic of Korea to catch equal amounts of fish are provided for in
terms of the maximum number of fishing vessels or fishing units in
operation. In fact, in the agreed minutes between the two countries,
the standard amount of the total annual fish catch by dragnet, seine,
and mackerel-angling by fishing vessels of not less than 60 tons is made
equal at 150,000 tons with an allowance of 10 percent upwards or
downwards. Thus, the Japan-Republic of Korea agreement on fisheries
is notable because it incorporates orthodox fishery regulations and the
idea of equal sharing of sea resources as well.
The Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Fisheries Commission, composed of two national sections, was established to effectuate the purposes of this agreement (article 6). All resolutions, recommendations,
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and other decisions of the Commission are made only by agreement
between the national sections. The Commission is empowered (article
7) to make recommendations to the parties with respect to: (1) scientific surveys conducted for the study of fishery resources in waters of
common interest, and regulation measures taken within the joint regulation zone on the basis of such survey and study; (2) the extent of the
joint resources survey zones; (3) measures for the revision of the
provisional regulations made on the basis of results of deliberation on
matters concerning them; (4) measures to be taken on the basis of
deliberation on necessary matters concerning the safety and order of
operation among the fishing vessels of the parties and methods for
handling accidents on the sea between the fishing vessels of the parties;
(5) the enactment of schedules of equivalent penalties for violations of
the agreement; (6) measures concerning various technical questions
arising from the implementation of the agreement.
Any dispute over interpretation and implementation of the agreement is to be settled first through diplomatic channels. When this fails
an ad hoc arbitration board is supposed to settle the matter. This board
is composed of three arbitrators, one to be appointed by each party and
the third to be agreed upon by the two arbitrators. Both governments
have agreed to abide by any award made by the arbitration board
(article 9). This arbitration clause is unique; only the European Convention on Fisheries of 1964 has a similar provision. This is an indication of the difficult and complicated fisheries problems faced by Japan
and the Republic of Korea, as well as the distrust that each party holds
against the other.
This convention was brought into force on December 18, 1965. It
will continue in force for a 5-year period and thereafter until one year
after either party gives notice of terminating the convention (article 10).
IV. CONCLUSION

After having explored three international agreements concerning
North Pacific fisheries, of which Japan is a party, we discover that the
traditional formula of free competition of fishing on the high seas has
been replaced by different formulas for allocating these fishery resources. Japan, one of the most advanced fishing nations, could have
exploited a great many high seas fisheries if the agreements had been
drafted so as to permit her to compete freely on the high seas with
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other nations (even with a restriction fixed for conservation purposes). It is not the writer's intention to blame the conventions themselves or to suggest that Canada, the United States or the Soviet Union
were not actually concerned with the conservation of fish stocks. The
writer only wishes to point out that these conventions are simply the
results of detailed negotiations with respect to the allocation of fish
resources under different situations, and that it is too premature to
generalize any principle supporting the artificial allocation of fish
resources for the benefit of some historically or geographically privileged States, or to discard the principle of free competition endorsed by
modern history in many fields as one of the basic values. 5 Few will
doubt that, until the time comes, when, as in the municipal society,
some super-authority can guarantee equitable sharing of different resources among the nations, the states will continue to argue for adoption of principles most favorable to their own interests in the field of
high seas fishing.

"Cf. S. Oda, Distribution of Fish Resources of the High Seas-Free Competition or Artificial Quota?, June 27, 1967 (Paper presented at the Law of the Sea Institute, Kingston, Rhode Island).
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